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Abstract
While much of the emphasis has been on when and how economies may safely re-open due to the
coronavirus pandemic, this article studies the undervalued workplace considerations therein. The
initial responses of Member States to the pandemic are outlined for the purpose of setting out
similarities and distinctions, but also and mostly to foreground an analysis to date of unresolved
problems related to work. Important points for continued monitoring are also identified and an
overview of some of the employment law considerations in re-opening workplaces are critically
assessed. Consequently, teleworking garners particular attention due to its prominent role during
the lockdown and its possible growing place in labour law in the near future.
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I. Introduction
On 11 March 2020, World Health Organisation (WHO) Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus declared Covid-19 had reached the level of a pandemic.1 The announcement date
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marks a convenient point for canvassing and then analysing governments’ actions regarding
employment. Since that time, there has been a preoccupation with discussions surrounding reces-
sion, depression, and other downward economic measurements. Given the amount of money that
has been spent in order to maintain a sizeable number of workers while businesses have largely
been temporarily closed due to the pandemic, the possibility of austerity measures or tax increases
looms. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated in March 2020 that 25 million jobs
would be lost due to Covid-19.2 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted, in April 2020,
the global economy would contract by about 3%,3 with the growth figure amongst advanced
economies (such as France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US) being about -6.1%.4 In May
2020, the European Commission estimated a contraction of about 8% in EU GDP, with a ‘rebound’
of 6% in 2021.5 It also forecast the euro area rate of unemployment as approximately 9.5%.6
Without getting ahead of the immediate health crisis of Covid-19, this pandemic challenges the
status quo regarding employment and the economy in the coming years. Still, the longer-term
effects of the pandemic of 2020 lie further ahead than the more immediate planning for a return to
work, as well as managing a fluid situation until (if) a vaccine (or pharmaceutical treatment) is
developed and widely available. This article focuses on the more immediate planning for a return
to work where many uncertainties remain. To further illustrate the point, consider the IMF state-
ment in April 2020 as an orthodox response to the pandemic: ‘This crisis will need to be dealt with
in two phases: a phase of containment and stabilization followed by the recovery phase.’7 A step is
missing. The preoccupation with thinking about a time when Covid-19 has passed has meant that
we are in danger of overlooking matters of more immediate urgency. An important bridge between
containment and recovery is currently underdeveloped and it centres on how countries deal with
the work(place) implications of the pandemic. Dealing with the virus at the workplace level must
be one essential pillar in any overarching response. It may additionally prompt a reconsideration of
the organisation of the workplace and its regulation at the national and European levels.
The workplace requires attention to health and safety considerations which are inextricably
linked to the economy. If insufficient steps are taken to limit the virus’ spread as individuals return
to their workplaces, businesses may again be profoundly impacted and the economic implications
extended, with even more far-reaching consequences than anticipated in relation to the lockdown
in and around March to May 2020. Equally essential, the role of work in the economy and its
purpose when the very health of the population is at stake might need to be reconsidered or at least
made an object for further reflection.
The article commences with an overview of measures taken regarding businesses and their
workers; calling upon the select country reports which can also be found in this issue. Those pieces
summarise the initiatives of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and addi-
tionally, the United Kingdom.8 These contributions also offer brief analyses regarding support
2. International Labour Organisation, COVID-19 and the world of work: Impact and policy responses (18 March 2020).
3. International Monetary Fund, The Great Lockdown (April 2020), vii.
4. Ibid 5.
5. European Commission, European Economic Forecast – Spring 2020 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European
Union, May 2020), 9.
6. Ibid 5.
7. International Monetary Fund, The Great Lockdown (April 2020), v.
8. An effort has been made to state the law as of 8 May 2020; though some reports have discussed measures passed after
that date.
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programmes. Drawing from those submissions, in this piece, country examples are contrasted, and
a critical overview of these efforts is offered. The ensuing sections aim to highlight some points for
further attention related to what is viewed as a gradual or staggered return to work, as compared to
the circumstances faced prior to the pandemic. A concerted effort has been made to factor into the
discussion the legitimate concerns of both employees and employers. A role has been played at
different levels and stages by social partners in planning, implementing and monitoring measures
that have been taken, which includes social dialogue and collective bargaining. However, since the
role of trade unions has not been as prominent in all jurisdictions under study, discussion of trade
unions is generally muted in this piece and the accompanying national reports. Their opportunities
to contribute to government plans vary across the countries discussed herein. The role given to
trade unions, especially when contemplating the significant work that has been and will need to be
carried out, warrants separate and more lengthy treatment than could be undertaken here.
The final goal of this assessment is to demonstrate that the crisis has revealed some regulatory
vacuums with reference to teleworking, while making it essential for many workers without clear
(normative) frameworks of at least some basic rights, such as the right to disconnect, an adaptation
of the Working Time Directive, and the right of employers to give directions and instructions
which may have shifted where teleworking has been introduced. In sum, working from home
presents its own challenges for employment regulation.
II. Immediate state responses
The following WHO summation of how Covid-19 may be transmitted hints at the profound
challenges faced by states, medical personnel, as well as employers and workers:
When someone who has COVID-19 coughs or exhales they release droplets of infected fluid. Most of
these droplets fall on nearby surfaces and objects, such as desks, tables or telephones. People could
catch COVID-19 by touching contaminated surfaces or objects, and then touching their eyes, nose, or
mouth. If they are standing within 1 meter of a person with COVID-19 they can catch it by breathing in
droplets coughed out or exhaled by them. In other words, COVID-19 spreads in a similar way to flu.9
Becoming increasingly aware of the disastrous impact Covid-19 may have, states responded at
different speeds, depending on the (intensiveness of the) spread of the virus. In the EU, Italy was
the first country in Europe to experience a very quick spread of the virus among its population.
Hence, Italy’s government decided to completely lock down all the activities and movements first
within the so-called ‘red zone’, i.e. the area where the very first cases were detected and where the
virus started and quickly spread. Progressively, such measures were extended to broader areas until
9 March 2020, the date on which the entire country was ‘locked down’,10 resulting in severe
restrictions to leaving the place of residence except to provide for food and medicine, to work
9. World Health Organisation, ‘Getting your workplace ready for COVID-19’ (19 March 2020), 1. https://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331584/WHO-2019-nCov-workplace-2020.2-eng.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
10. Lockdown has been a relatively uniform term until efforts to re-open businesses around May 2020. There have been
essential businesses/services that continued. There has been divergence amongst countries around the world regarding
this classification (with one example being construction). Amongst the countries discussed here, lockdown has been
fairly uniform since late March 2020 when most retail stores shifted to online sales, food stores remained open, and
public transit remained available.
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(under certain conditions) and for emergencies.11 A further move consisted of shutting down any
non-essential economic activity as of 22 March 2020.12
Similar actions could be observed in many countries.13 Germany, with its first reported case of
Covid-19 at the end of January 2020, took its first measures on 12 March 2020, concentrating on
preparing hospitals for the increase in demand for intensive care and ventilation capacity by, where
medically justifiable, postponing in principle all plannable admissions, operations and interven-
tions. Other actions at federal level followed suit: a comprehensive package of measures to
mitigate the economic effects of the coronavirus, followed various other measures including the
use of short time work (13 March 2020) and restricting cross-border free movement (15 March
2020). More particular actions were taken at federal state level. On 27 February 2020, the Nether-
lands announced its first officially known Covid-19 patient. Three weeks later, on 17 March 2020,
the government adopted an ‘Emergency Jobs and Economy Package’. As is the case in many
countries, general measures were taken to protect public health including the prohibition of events
such as sporting events, concerts or festivals and the closure of public places such as museums,
theatres, sports clubs, bars, cafe´s and restaurants. Shops, marketplaces and public transport could
only remain open if the relevant hygiene measures had been sufficiently complied with (e.g.,
observing the 1.5-metre distance rule). Gatherings in groups in public spaces had been banned
and large events were prohibited, people worked from home and schools were closed. Spain
declared a state of emergency on 14 March, prohibiting all educational, recreational, cultural,
sports and commercial activities. Later on, due to the worsening of the pandemic’s spread, all non-
essential activities were also suspended. Unlike in other countries, the spread of the coronavirus
was much slower in Luxembourg, with its first reported case on 1 March 2020. Nevertheless,
Luxembourg decided to take steps from 16 March 2020, closing schools, non-essential public
services and universities. By declaring a state of emergency, the parliament has been allowed to
undertake special measures to face the pandemic.14 On 28 February 2020, Ireland reported its first
case of Covid-19.15 The Irish Government moved to a ‘delay’ phase on 12 March 2020, with social
distancing and self-isolation for those with symptoms.16 By 28 March 2020, a lockdown was in
place affecting all but essential businesses and movement for food and medical appointments.17
Some of these measures have been partially or entirely suspended or softened in many countries.
As from the beginning of May, certain activities have been reopened and citizens have been
allowed to move without the restrictions imposed during the lockdown. Many workers have come
11. Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 9 March 2020.
12. Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 22 March 2020 and Decree of the President of the Council of
Ministers of 10 April 2020. See Marco Biasi’s article on Italy in this volume.
13. Though most did, not all countries participated in the lockdown, such as Sweden. For further information on Sweden
see Caroline Johansson, ‘Covid-19 and Labour Law: Sweden’ (2020) 13 Italian Labour Law E-Journal, https://doi.org/
10.6092/issn.1561-8048/10774.
14. See Luca Ratti’s article on Luxembourg in this volume.
15. Raidio´ Teilifı´s E´ireann (RTE´), ‘All those in close contact with Covid-19 patient ‘notified’ (28 February 2020), www.
rte.ie/news/ireland/2020/0228/1118104-coronavirus-ireland.
16. Department of Health, ‘Statement from the National Public Health Emergency Team - Thursday 12 March’, www.gov.
ie/en/press-release/96eb4c-statement-from-the-national-public-health-emergency-team (12 March 2020).
17. Rory Carroll, ‘‘‘Stay home’’: Varadkar announces sweeping two-week lockdown’ The Guardian (27 March 2020).
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/27/stay-home-varadkar-urges-irish-in-drastic-lockdown. See also the article
on Ireland in this volume.
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back to work, where specific health and safety measures have been adopted; while many others
have carried on working from home or continue to have their employment relationships suspended.
While the above summation offers minor hints as to what steps states have undertaken, the key
question regarding why states acted when they did and what effect this had will likely be posed of
each government at a later stage. Albeit important, this will not be discussed further here. Instead,
two primary responses that are relevant in a labour law context have been largely deployed: social
distancing – consisting of state-wide policies including mandatory remote working (where avail-
able) coupled with stay-home instructions while avoiding meeting people with whom you are not
sharing a home – and income support for individuals through state-administered schemes.
In this section, social distancing is not separately discussed because it pervades each of the sub-
topics below. The discussion commences with a synthesis of the income support plans undertaken
by the countries under study. Engagement with work that has continued during the lockdown
follows the section on income support. It is an engaging topic for there is a refreshing change
in perspective on essential work precipitated by the pandemic. Extending the attention to essential
workers, health and safety issues offer a stark reminder of the peril those in this cohort face when
they go to work.
A. Income support
Across the states, similar income support18 arrangements have largely been devised to assist
businesses and workers: a temporary wage subsidy, unemployment allowance, means to assist
working parents, sick pay and assistance for the self-employed.19 On the whole, the aim of these
plans has been to provide some income for residents20 who support themselves through paid work.
None of the schemes have purported to provide 100% income replacement; nor have they assured
continued employment after the measures have ceased. For those who have lost their positions due
to the pandemic, some governments have amended unemployment allowances (increasing rates
and eliminating waiting periods). Some workers remain engaged and carry out their duties at home
or on-site if they are an essential service. Workers from the cohort who are unable to work due to
Covid-19 (as well as those who have care responsibilities related to family members suffering from
the symptoms of the virus or childcare obligations due to the closure of schools) may also avail
themselves of the related sick pay provisions. The extension of income support to the self-
employed warrants attention given the rise in self-employment and work characterised as such.
i. Temporary wage subsidy. Overall, many governments have incentivised employers to retain their
workers instead of dismissing them due to the consequential downturn in trade with the temporary
closure of non-essential businesses. While the ultimate aim of a temporary wage subsidy has been
18. Income support would seem to fit within the first objective of ILO Recommendation 205 (Employment and decent
work for peace and resilience). Further elaboration is found in: ILO, ILO Standards and Covid-19 (23 March 2020),
vers.1.2.
19. To comply with the EU state aid rules, Member States’ income replacement measures are considered as compatible
with the EU’s internal market, being qualified as ‘aid to promote the execution of an important project of common
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’ (Art. 107(2)(b) TFEU) or as
‘aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy of a Member State’ (Art. 107(3)(b) TFEU). See further https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
what_is_new/covid_19.html.
20. Residents is used here to note that foreign or non-citizen workers have also been impacted.
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to sustain as much of the workforce as possible, some countries, such as Italy, Spain, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, encouraged the employers to retain staff at least for a certain period, by
extending worker retention schemes funded by public money, and at the same time by prohibiting
dismissal or imposing a prohibition on dismissal as a precondition to receiving the wage subsidy.
Italy and Spain adopted restrictions on individual and collective dismissal procedures for economic
reasons. Italy prohibited individual dismissals on economic grounds and collective layoffs from 17
March 2020 to 17 May 2020, as well as suspending decisions on those that were already pending.
Spain declared all dismissals made on economic or force majeure grounds null and void. Employ-
ees covered by the Luxembourg scheme cannot be made redundant for economic reasons. Whether
these countries will experience a wave of redundancies at a later stage forms an important question
seeking a critical answer.
Income support as a temporary wage subsidy for workers (also identified as a job retention
scheme) is available from governments providing money to qualifying businesses that retain their
workers. It seems that two different systems exist, with the UK on one end of the spectrum and all
other countries dealt with in this contribution on the other end. Wage subsidies, with the exception
of the UK, can be granted if companies have had to (temporarily) reduce a minimum amount of
working hours. Overall, it seems that some Member States have simplified access to temporary
wage subsidy schemes (Germany, Belgium,21 Italy,22 Spain,23 France,24 Italy).25 Although access
to the schemes has been eased, employers may be required 26or a reduction in the employees’ gross
wage 10%within one month of a given company (department) (at least 10% of the remuneration of
one third of the employees in Germany)27. Scrutiny may be properly directed at the decision to
exclude a reduction in working hours from CJRS eligibility. From August 2020, the UK Govern-
ment will permit some form of part-time work to be performed under its wage subsidy scheme.
Note, though, that this scheme is set to expire at the end of October 2020.28 ‘Furlough’, in the UK,
has been defined as applying to those ‘employees who have been asked to stop working, but who
are being kept on the pay roll’.29 Early in the furlough period, accommodation/food services
21. See further, Frank Hendrickx, Simon Taes, and Mathias Wouters’ article on Belgium in this volume.
22. Ordinary Wage Guarantee Fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria).
23. Temporary suspension of employment (ERTEs, ‘Expedientes de Regulacio´n Temporal de Empleo’). In addition,
companies in Spain were granted extraordinary exemptions from their Social Security obligations. See further, Manuel
Antonio Garcı´a-Mun˜oz Alhambra’s article on Spain in this volume.
24. See further, Tatiana Sachs’ article on France in this volume.
25. Derogatory Wage Guarantee Fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Deroga). See further, Marco Biasi’s article on
Italy in this volume.
26. An example is the Irish Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Covid-19) Bill 2020, s.28(1)(3)
27. The Irish approach is a bit more intricate. Technically the temporary wage subsidy in Ireland operates like the CJRS in
the UK. However, Ireland has schemes available for a reduction in working hours, depending upon workers’ situations.
So, there is support in Ireland for reduced hours, but it does not operate in a manner similar to that of other EU Member
States discussed herein. For further details, see the report on Ireland in this volume.
28. Her Majesty’s Treasury, ‘Chancellor extends furlough scheme until October’ (12 May 2020), www.gov.uk/govern
ment/news/chancellor-extends-furlough-scheme-until-october.
29. Daniel Ferguson, ‘FAQ: Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’ CBP 8880 (House of Commons Library, London) (9
April 2020), 8. On its first day, 185,000 firms submitted claims for the CJRS, with 1.3 million employees being
furloughed: HM Revenue & Customs Twitter feed https://twitter.com/HMRCgovuk/status/1252616495407992834?
mc_cid¼18b23520d5&mc_eid¼%5bUNIQID.
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(40%)30 and construction (30%) industries comprised the majority of furloughed employees in UK
businesses which continued to trade.31 The education and information/communication technolo-
gies sectors in the UK had the lowest numbers of furloughed workforces.32
Income support levels differ among the Member States, although some increased the support.
Employees in Ireland initially received up to 70% of take-home pay per month;33 increased to 85%
for the lowest paid (those earning up to EUR 24,400).34 This figure is 80% in Germany (87% for
employees with children, both paid under the condition that it does not exceed 12 months)35 and
Luxembourg (on the condition that it does not exceed 1.022 hours in total per year, is not less than
the statutory minimum wage and not more than 250% of that wage). The UK also provides 80% of
take-home pay to a maximum of GBP 2,500 per month.36 In the Netherlands, an employer
experiencing a 100% decrease in turnover is entitled to a subsidy of 90% of the wage sum (i.e.
the wage for social insurance purposes up to a maximum of EUR 9,538 per employee per month)
over the period between 1 March 2020 and 31 May 2020.37 If the decrease in turnover is lower, the
subsidy will be reduced accordingly.38
While wage subsidies may help in avoiding bankruptcies, a question persists as to whether, in
some cases at least, this will only postpone dismissals to some point in the near future. Thus,
countries which offer both options of income support as a wage subsidy and unemployment
without any restrictions to the use of redundancies or dismissals will be of particular interest in
assessing whether employers have made a decision to retain staff or to immediately reduce staff
(thereby putting workers on unemployment allowance). This depends on the dismissal law
protections in place and/or the business (sector) itself; with some countries having introduced
particular prohibitions at least in the short-term, and what the expectations are in terms of
re-opening. What may arise is that income support bridges the gap until employers make deter-
minations regarding staff; at which point the redundancy regime may be affected. Notably, the
size of workforces will likely be trimmed, in some sectors more than in others,39 because of the
30. Where 81% of businesses in this industry had temporarily closed or ceased trading: Office of National Statistics,
‘Furloughing of workers across UK businesses: 23 March 2020 to 5 April 2020’ (23 April 2020), 5.
31. Ibid 3.
32. ‘[B]usinesses that continued trading, with 3% and 6% of furloughed staff respectively, and in businesses that had
temporarily ceased trading, with 13% and 24% respectively’: Ibid 7.
33. Department of Business, Innovation and Enterprise, ‘Government announces National Covid-19 Income Support
Scheme’ (24 March 2020), https://dbei.gov.ie/en/News-And-Events/Department-News/2020/March/24032020.html.
34. Department of Finance, ‘Minister Donohoe announces update to the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme to ensure
greater staff retention and links between employer and employee’ (15 April 2020), www.gov.ie/en/news/c3e1eb-
minister-donohoe-announces-update-to-the-temporary-wage-subsidy-sche.
35. Bundesfinanzministerium, ‘Kurzarbeitergeld in der Coronakrise’ (23 April 2020), www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/
Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/Corona-Schutzschild/2020-03-19-Beschaeftigung-fuer-alle.html.
Initially, the benefit paid by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) covered 60% of the net loss
of wages and 67% for employees with children.
36. Her Majesty’s Treasury, The Coronavirus Act 2020 Functions of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme) Direction (15 April 2020), [7.1].
37. The decrease in turnover can take place in a different period, see eligibility.
38. See Hanneke Bennaars’ article on The Netherlands in this volume.
39. Sectors that most likely will experience a long-term disruption with bankruptcies and layoffs: entertainment, tourism,
restaurants, transportation, and aviation.
Mangan et al. 7
sense of uncertainty that pervades. Indeed, some businesses may close permanently (as some
have already).40
Arguably, income support delays many questions regarding future employment (including force
majeure, where an employee is unable to attend at work due to quarantine, self-isolation, sickness,
public transit shutdown or the diminishing of those services). Not all Member States, however, are
adopting income support through employers. In Belgium, the state has increased the allowance for
employees who are temporarily unemployed due to force majeure or economic reasons to 70% (up
from 65%) until 30 June 2020. Still, the triggering of force majeure clauses deserves monitoring as
this situation develops.
ii. Unemployment allowance. For those employees who have lost their jobs due to Covid-19 or where
there is no temporary wage subsidy, unemployment payments may be available. Not all workers
that are part of the temporary wage subsidy will, and can, automatically be retained. However,
retaining a workforce with significant state subsidies in place must be viewed as a significant step
in recognising the concerns in increasing unemployment figures and payments. Thus, there are
foreseeable difficulties where a large pool of workers seeks employment simultaneously, compet-
ing for what are likely to be fewer available positions as workplaces return to business. Particularly
problematic is the situation of atypical workers, such as fixed-term and on-call workers, whose
employment relationship has come to an end.41 For them, wage subsidies are not available and
even though, in theory, unemployment benefits may be available, often the legal conditions are
framed so narrowly so that they are not yet eligible. Overall, decreases in unemployment rates will
not be uniform across the EU due to the uneven effect of Covid-19 on Member States, coupled with
existing vulnerabilities.
In Luxembourg, despite the prohibition to dismiss employees covered by the choˆmage partiel
income support scheme, as of 31 March, 18,398 unemployment claims had been processed by the
Luxembourgish employment agency, showing an increase of 17.5% in comparison to last year.
Consequently, the Luxembourg government extended all unemployment benefits for the duration
of the pandemic crisis and conditionalities have been softened.42 Belgium has liberalised its use of
temporary unemployment during the pandemic. As Hendrickx, Taes, and Wouters explain in this
volume:
Temporary unemployment provides for a mechanism whereby, in cases where an employment contract
needs to be temporarily interrupted (suspended) for economic reasons or for reasons of force majeure,
an employer is allowed to suspend the work activities as well as the payment of wages, while the
employee concerned is entitled to an unemployment benefit borne by the social security system.
And so, in Belgium, the government’s action has effectively interpreted temporary unemployed
due to force majeure in a flexible manner; one that carries implications which may be interpreted as
limited to the pandemic situation. Germany’s short-time work regulations are accustomed to large
numbers because of its success during the 2008/09 economic crisis. Preliminary data from the Irish
Central Statistics Office suggests that the preponderance of workers (283,037) passed through the
40. The restaurant chain Carluccio is one example. See In the Matter of Carluccio’s [2020] EWHC 886 (Ch), where the
court held that super-priority payments were to be made to furloughed employees in the circumstances.
41. See Hanneke Bennaars’ article on the Netherlands in this volume.
42. See Luca Ratti’s article on Luxembourg in this volume.
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unemployment payment, compared with 25,104 individuals treated under the temporary wage
subsidy.43 By 15 April, this figure increased to 43,000 companies.44 For April 2020, the Irish
unemployment rate (treating all Covid-19 unemployment payment recipients as unemployed) was
28.2%.45 The Irish Government’s increase of 15% (from 70% to 85%) for the temporary wage
subsidy of lower wage workers suggests its level of concern regarding the disparity in figures.
If we extrapolate from the Irish data and the figures remain in this proportion, a more profound
challenge emerges because state incentives to retain workers through temporary wage subsidies as
opposed to termination due to the pandemic will not have yielded a significant uptake which was
part of their aim. While payments at the lower end may have been less than what workers would
have received in unemployment allowance, the fear must be deeper. It speaks to the uncertainty
businesses have in the immediate future and how this sentiment guides their cautious approach to
the immediate circumstances.46 Employers that immediately turned to trimming their workforce
may have taken long-term decisions (how to keep a business running with a proper amount of staff)
more quickly. While this might be justified by their plight, it remains to be seen what impact this
may have on the labour market in general.
Those who do not find positions remain dependent upon the state until such time as they can
find work. The temporary wage subsidy represents more than just the state taking significant action
in rare circumstances. The subsidy signifies a linkage between industry and government that
betrays the limitations of free market governance. Additionally, it underscores, only a few years
after the Great Recession, how dependent countries have become upon the globalised economic
framework.
iii. Sick pay. Eligibility for sick pay ranges from those with Covid-19 to those required to self-
isolate due to exhibiting symptoms. An employee suffering from the coronavirus is released from
the obligation to work47 and remains entitled to remuneration paid by the employer in full for a
period of up to six weeks if s/he has fallen ill through no fault of their own.48 Like in Germany
and Italy, there have been no specific new measures or amendments made regarding rules on sick
pay in the Netherlands. Therefore, under Dutch law, and this is quite exceptional from a com-
parative view, the employer is, by statute, obliged to pay employees on sick leave for a period of
2 years. During that period, employees are entitled to 70% of their salary up to a maximum of
70% of the maximum day wage (currently EUR 219.28 gross per day). On the other hand, in
Ireland, this payment has been increased to EUR 350 per week and the waiting period until
benefits may be accessed has been waived (a six-day wait period).49 In the UK, Statutory Sick
Pay of GBP 95.85 per week has been available for employees for up to 28 weeks from
43. www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2020pressreleases/pressstatementliveregistermarch2020.
44. www.gov.ie/en/news/c3e1eb-minister-donohoe-announces-update-to-the-temporary-wage-subsidy-sche.
45. The Central Statistics Office, ‘Press Statement Monthly Unemployment April 2020’ (8 May 2020), www.cso.ie/en/
releasesandpublications/er/mue/monthlyunemploymentapril2020.
46. On this point, the IMF wrote in The Great Lockdown, 4: ‘There is extreme uncertainty around the global growth
forecast because the economic fallout depends on uncertain factors that interact in ways hard to predict.’
47. Para. 275(1) and (3) Civil Code.
48. Para. 3(1) 1 Continued Payment Act, Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz.
49. Department of Business, Innovation and Enterprise, ‘Illness Benefit for COVID-19 absences’, www.gov.ie/en/service/
df55ae-how-to-apply-for-illness-benefit-for-covid-19-absences.
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employers,50 from the first day of illness without the waiting period (for illness arising on or after
13 March 2020).51
iv. Support for the self-employed. Income support for the self-employed indirectly recognises the
increasing prevalence of self-employment in the 21st century. Many countries offer such support,
albeit at different levels. While the UK is offering 80% income support to this cohort of workers,
the payment system is not going to be ready until June 2020. Irish self-employed individuals may
be eligible for the Covid-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment of EUR 350 or the temporary
wage subsidy, depending upon their circumstances. In Belgium, self-employed persons may be
eligible for a bridge-right (droit-passerelle) amounting to financial support up to EUR 1614.10 per
month. In Italy, self-employed workers and seasonal workers were granted an extraordinary
allowance of EUR 600 for the months of March and April 2020. Self-employed workers in
Luxembourg have been granted a special sum aimed at responding to the lack of liquidity as a
direct consequence of the pandemic crisis.52 Similarly, in the Netherlands, self-employed persons
can apply for income support, depending on the self-employed person’s previous income and his
household situation, to a maximum of EUR 1,500 (net) per month for a period of three months
between March and August. In addition, self-employed persons can apply for a loan for business
capital to a maximum amount of EUR 10,157, with a lower interest rate and the possibility to ask
for postponing repayment. Support for the self-employed, however, does not seem to avoid the
issue that has characterised the ‘gig’ or platform economy, where employment status has been a
frequently litigated issue (often with Uber being the defendant enterprise).53
Offering support for the self-employed constitutes a significant step; principally with regard to
the ongoing discussion on differentiating between dependent and independent workers,54 the latter
bearing their own business risks and remaining responsible to take care of periods of illness and
without having work. Given the many uncertain factors stemming from the pandemic relating to
work, it is not possible to give a clear statement on the exact meaning of this support measure nor
what it might mean for the future. Income support for this cohort may stem from an extended view
of assistance to businesses, where self-employed persons should equally be helped by the state.
Self-employed persons have been similarly distressed by their financial situation as those who are
unemployed.55 Still, it remains to be seen to what extent this step becomes an entry point for
treating the self-employed more like workers. On the point, the European Commission’s urging of
Member States, when implementing new law or adopting existing implementations to keep in mind
stifling innovation and smothering SMEs or micro-employers, should be not be overlooked.
v. Rights for working parents. The current coronavirus crisis has involved increasing the burden on
those employees and self-employed persons who have children requiring care. With schools and
50. ‘Statutory Sick Pay (SSP)’, www.gov.uk/statutory-sick-pay.
51. Coronavirus Act 2020, c.7, s.40; The Statutory Sick Pay (Coronavirus) (Suspension of Waiting Days and General
Amendment) Regulations 2020, S.I. 2020/374, s.2.
52. See Luca Ratti’s article on Luxembourg in this volume.
53. The French Court of Cassation (Labour Chamber)’s decision of March 2020 is a more recent example: Cass Soc, 4 mars
2020, Appeal no. S 19-13.316.
54. For a recent decision on this point see the Canadian decision in Canadian Union of Postal Workers v Foodora Inc, 2020
CanLII 16750 (ON LRB).
55. Eurofound, ‘Living, working and COVID-19 First findings – April 2020’ 8.
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childcare facilities being closed to the majority of the workforce, except for those in critical jobs,
many are juggling working from home with organising home-schooling or home care. Parents in
Germany who need to take care of their child(ren) can be released from the duty to work.56 This
applies to children aged under 12.57 It is not in all cases that (nearly) full-time childcare is
required, meaning that employees, under German law, for the insignificant amount of time they
need childcare, may be entitled to having the agreed remuneration paid by the employer.58 In
addition, childcare is a reason for unpaid leave of absence and receiving sickness benefits under
social law.59 Furthermore, from 30 March 2020, a new benefit is available, aimed at compensat-
ing for loss of wages and paid by government agencies in case schools or childcare facilities have
been closed for reasons of infection control.60 Not having special measures in the Netherlands,
parents either need to take special leave, which is particularly short in time, or regular (or, as is in
the UK, unpaid)61 leave.
B. Work during the lockdown/isolation period
Two categories of workers fall under this heading: those who can work remotely (i.e. teleworking)
and therefore continue to perform their contractual obligations; and those who have been recog-
nised as essential workers. In addition to treatment here, those working remotely also warrant
further consideration in the third part of this article under the heading teleworking.
i. Teleworking. Dealing with Covid-19 has involved a huge increase in the proportion of people
working from home62 as many individuals in non-critical office jobs have carried on throughout
the ‘lockdown’ period in their homes.63 Individuals who moved to teleworking largely had pre-
vious experience with this form of work; though approximately 24% of workers had turned to
teleworking for the first time.64 Prior to the pandemic, there were many employers that were
hesitant to allow remote working, for reasons of lack of control or reduced levels of commitment.65
Covid-19 may have contributed to a change of view as it worked well for many workers.
Following data collected by Eurofound, in 2015, approximately on average one fifth of workers
56. Para. 275(3) Civil Code.
57. Para. 45(1) and (4) Social Code V.
58. Paras. 611a(2) and 616 Civil Code.
59. Para. 45 Social Code V.
60. Para. 56(1a) Infection Protection Act, Infektionsschutzgesetz.
61. www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/parental_leave.
html
62. Eurofound wrote that the increase in teleworking was more than a 30% increase, with ‘above 50% in Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, and 40% or more in Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Italy’: Eurofound, ‘Living,
working and COVID-19 First findings – April 2020’ 5.
63. The European Commission announced, to mention one example, as of 16 March, all staff in non-critical functions will
move to telework. Those, however, in critical functions will continue to be present at work, working in shifts. See
European Commission, ‘Coronavirus: Measures introduced for Commission staff’ (12 March 2020), https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_445.
64. Eurofound, ‘Living, working and COVID-19 First findings – April 2020’ 6.
65. Oscar Vargas-Llave, Irene Mandl, Tina Weber & Mathijn Wilkens, ‘Telework and ICT-based mobile work: Flexible
working in the digital age’ (New forms of employment series, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg
2020) 42, available at: www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2020/telework-and-ict-based-mobile-work-flex
ible-working-in-the-digital-age.
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teleworked.66 Eurofound discovered that there have been enormous differences among the EU
Member States, with Denmark at the upper end and Italy at the lower end of the spectrum.
Apparently, this diversity may be attributable to ‘a combination of factors, such as a country’s
affinity for technology; the availability and quality of its technological infrastructure; management
culture and the drive for higher productivity within companies; and employees’ needs for spatial
and temporal flexibility to balance work demands with family commitments and other personal
responsibilities.’67
Clearly, teleworking is available to those working in businesses that did not need to close down
or did so only, to some extent, due to a drop in orders. Of course, a matter of concern here is the
situation of those on whom a double workload was imposed, namely, working remotely and taking
care of their children concurrently. It is expected that working remotely while communicating with
colleagues and clients or customers via the internet, may continue after Covid-19. Notably, this
puts women at a particular disadvantage, for they continue to have primary responsibility for child
and elderly care.68 Day-care has been mostly made available to essential workers only, to secure
the continuation of essential services.
If it is a means of working that is here to stay for an increasing number of employees, even after
the pandemic, teleworking blurs the boundaries between work and non-work time, thereby war-
ranting particular attention. Illustrating the complexity of the issue, privacy rights, as protected by
Art. 8 ECHR as well as data protection rights, extensively regulated by the GDPR, need to be
addressed and assessed properly. This is even more the case where tools are used to trace and track
the productivity and location of employees.
Italy introduced ‘agile work’ in 201769 and defined it as a way to perform the employment
contract where the employee might carry out his or her duty inside or outside the employer’s
premises and without the rigid respect of the working time regulation, with the exception of those
limitations imposed by the law or by collective bargaining agreements on the maximum duration
of the working activity. It is up to the parties of the employment contract to mutually agree on agile
work and determine some basic conditions, within the limits set by the law. The situation in
Germany is comparable. Working from home can be instructed by the employer if it has been
collectively or individually agreed. It is questionable, though, whether, in case no agreement exists,
the employer is entitled to instruct employees based on its right to ‘reasonable discretion’. So far at
least, there has been no right for employees to work from home, except where employees cannot be
protected efficiently at their current workplace (e.g. due to a medical condition). Of course, in
many countries, due to coronavirus, it has been the established practice for employers to, as much
as is possible, send workers home to work from there. With the spread of the virus, the Italian
Government strongly recommended the recourse to agile work in the private sector where possible,
making it lawful even without a previous individual agreement with the employee. Also, in
Luxembourg and Spain, the government pushed to increase the recourse to teleworking during
66. Eurofound, ‘COVID-19 could permanently change teleworking in Europe’ (23 March 2020), www.mynewsdesk.com/
eurofound/news/covid-19-could-permanently-change-teleworking-in-europe-397966.
67. Ibid.
68. Miriam Kullmann & Elisabeth Greif, ‘Time to Wonder: Covid-19 and the Risks of Home Office’ Regulating for
Globalization Blog (21 April 2020), http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2020/04/21/time-to-wonder-covid-19-and-
the-risks-of-home-office/?doing_wp_cron¼1587567347.7276721000671386718750.
69. Maurizio Del Conte & Elena Gramano, ‘Looking to the other side of the bench: the new legal status of independent
contractors under the Italian legal system’ (2018) 39 Comp Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 579.
12 European Labour Law Journal XX(X)
the pandemic. No particular rules exist in the Netherlands. Apart from negative experiences,
teleworking has also brought positives: some employees seem to be more productive; there is
more time due to the (temporary) disappearance of daily commuting. The present may be the time
to open the discussion on introducing a right to teleworking for employees, as is being discussed in
Germany (where it returned to the agenda due to Covid-19).70 It might be difficult to get a political
consensus on this issue, for one, because some employers might experience or perceive negative
repercussions if they cannot ‘control’ their workforce. Nevertheless, such a right might be a
valuable addition that benefits workers.
ii. Essential workers
Labour law has long known the term ‘essential services’ as a phrase relating to public sector work
and the prohibition on certain areas of public service being shut down by strike action. Essential
services are required, in such circumstances, to continue to operate with a reduced staff. The 2020
pandemic expanded what constitutes essential services. Around the world there has been no fixed
definition, but essential services have largely included health services, food stores (including
deliveries), pharmacies, banks, public transport, police, and government offices related to the
crisis (such as health and the treasury). Of those named, workers at food stores stand out because
these are not skilled positions (requiring some level of training) and are not known for high levels
of remuneration. And yet, these front-line workers – the workers who stock shelves, provide fresh
food, and operate cash registers – may perhaps be the most visible in this challenging situation.71
Recognition of their contribution has been noted by public figures, but has also come in more
tangible forms such as pay increases and use of state-provided childcare.72
Although an extended discussion would divert from the present topic, it is valuable to note
that the term ‘essential services’ does not mean one type of worker, but instead denotes a
wide-range of contributions from across the workforce. Essential workers usually are defined
by listing a range of activities, as has been done in the German Covid-19 Working Time
Regulations73 which allows extending working days up to 12 hours, if necessary to maintain
public safety and order, provide health care and nursing care, and services of general interest
or to supply the population with essential goods. In addition, there is a growing attention to
the female side of the crisis, as nurses and supermarket staff (high numbers of which are
women) fight in the front lines against the virus. However, at the same time, it appears that
closures and layoffs hit female-dominated sectors harder, such as tourism and retail. It follows
70. E.g. Sybille Haas, ‘Recht auf Heimarbeit’ Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (27 April 2020), www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
arbeitswelt-recht-auf-heimarbeit-1.4889842; Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht, ‘Kommt der gesetzliche Anspruch auf Home-
office?’ (8 January 2019), www.arbeit-und-arbeitsrecht.de/schlagzeilen/kommt-der-gesetzliche-anspruch-auf-home
office/2019/01/08.
71. Several Canadian grocers increased pay for workers (up to CAD 2 per hour) in recognition of the important contribution
made: ‘4 major Canadian grocers give front-line workers a raise during COVID-19 pandemic’ CBC News (23 March
2020), www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/sobeys-grocery-loblaw-metro-wages-pay-raise-covid-19-1.5506935.
72. Jim Vertuno, ‘Grocery workers are key during the virus. And they’re afraid’ PBS Newshour Weekend (5 April 2020),
www.pbs.org/newshour/health/grocery-workers-are-key-during-the-virus-and-theyre-afraid. The United Food and
Commercial Workers union has been engaged in on-going discussions on these matters with employers in both Canada
and the US.
73. COVID-19-Arbeitszeitverordnung.
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from data compiled by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) that, within the EU,
76% of the healthcare workers are women.74
C. Health and safety for (essential service) workers
Directly related to essential services, but not only, a topic that warrants separate treatment is health
and safety at work for these individuals. The World Health Organisation has outlined some
preventative measures within workplaces that can diminish the spread of the virus.75
There have been some remarkable news reports about the dearth of protective equipment for
this cohort, whether medical personnel76 or other workers.77 A fundamental principle must be that
workers do not go to work to become ill. The tragic passing of Belly Mujinga, a rail worker in
London, must serve as a lasting example of the risk faced by workers during the lockdown.78
Within the context of Covid-19, personal protective equipment (PPE) not only protects healthcare
personnel from contracting the virus, but it also aids in stemming the spread of the virus. And yet,
many workers remain persistently exposed to the risk of contracting Covid-19. While not all
exposed workers die as a result, this should not be the benchmark. There are many unknowns
presently. Regrettably, there have also been quite troubling comments from politicians insinuating
(if not stating) that healthcare workers, for example, were over-using protective equipment.79
A particular issue that requires attention in this context is countries relaxing working time
regulations for particular groups of employees. It must be seen whether these relaxations have a
long-term effect or not, but so far it seems they are rather exceptional. Quite specifically, to secure
the supply of essential goods, such as food and medication, the Dutch driving time and rest period
regulations have been relaxed, resulting in a daily maximum driving time of 11 hours instead of 9
hours, a weekly maximum driving time of 60 instead of 56 hours, a two-weekly maximum driving
time of 96 instead of 90 hours, and a weekly rest period starting 7 days after the last weekly rest
instead of 6 days. Furthermore, at the request of certain sectors, the Secretary of State of Social
Affairs and Employment has exempted some demands within the Health and Safety Act regarding
certificates that are necessary to perform some tasks. The exemptions are valid until 31 August
2020. Comparable working regulation extensions have been made available in Germany for
essential services, principally in the healthcare sector. In general, employees can be contractually
74. Eszter Zalan, ‘Women hit hardest by corona economic crisis’, EU Observer (23 April 2020), https://euobserver.com/
coronavirus/148155.
75. World Health Organization, ‘Getting your workplace ready for COVID-19’ (19 March 2020), 2. https://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331584/WHO-2019-nCov-workplace-2020.2-eng.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
76. Claire Press, ‘Coronavirus: The NHS workers wearing bin bags as protection’ BBC News (6 April 2020), www.bbc.
com/news/health-52145140.
77. Katie Johnston, ‘As more grocery store workers die, employees call for better protection’ (7 April 2020), www.bos
tonglobe.com/2020/04/07/business/more-grocery-store-workers-die-employees-call-better-protection.
78. Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association, ‘Death of a ticket office worker’ (12 May 2020), www.tssa.org.uk/en/whats-
new/news/index.cfm/death-of-a-ticket-office-worker.
79. US President Donald Trump wondered aloud about the theft of protective equipment from hospitals: ‘‘Maybe worse
than hoarding’: Trump implies hospital staff stealing masks – video’ The Guardian (30 March 2020), www.the
guardian.com/world/video/2020/mar/30/maybe-worse-than-hoarding-trump-implies-hospital-staff-stealing-masks-
video. The UK Health Secretary (Matt Hancock) was quoted as stating that protective equipment in hospitals must be
treated as a ‘precious resource’ because ‘[t]here’s enough PPE to go around, but only if it’s used in line with our
guidance.’ ‘Coronavirus: ‘‘Herculean effort’’ to provide NHS protective gear’ BBC News (11 April 2020), www.bbc.
com/news/uk-52248423.
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obliged to work overtime, but they can also be required to perform work beyond the contractually
agreed working hours if there is a risk of unavoidable damage.80 A newly adopted law introduced
due to the pandemic allows additional exceptions to maintain public security and order, health care
and nursing as well as services of general interest.81
Whether it is a hospital worker or a grocery store clerk, the risk of contracting the virus may be
more perilous where workers have access to neither health plans provided through employers nor
universal health care. Compounding the problem, many workers do not have ‘sick pay’ which
would permit workers who have symptoms to stay home (as medical advice has directed). Without
‘sick pay’, individuals must choose between earning an income in order to maintain what they have
or lose that pay (at least).
In the course of securing the health and safety in particular of those employees that provide
essential services, a situation that has caught widespread media attention is the outbidding of states,
in particular within the US, overbidding each other for personal protective equipment, inter alia,
resulting in manufacturers phoning state governors to inform them about another having outbid
them to push the price up.82 These scenarios have not only occurred in the US. A shipment of N95
masks by 3 M heading to Germany from China was diverted because, it was reported, the Amer-
ican President outbid them.83 These examples are quite worrisome if the scarcity of PPE, key to
protecting those on the frontline in combating the coronavirus crisis or those that secure other
essential services, means that they can only be bought for an excessively high price. One may
seriously question whether this illustrates some of the perils of an unfettered free market.
III. Returning to work: Opening Pandora’s box?
There has been no grand re-opening of Europe in the sense of a complete return to ‘normalcy’ (if
returning to what was before is wished for at all) at one time. Instead, as governments have initiated
a process of returning to pre-pandemic business, there will be a staggered return to work. The plan
may be premised on a tiered approach to essential services and needs, coupled with maintaining
distance amongst workers and patrons. It may be that the safest option for countries is to maintain
social distancing protocols until a vaccine is found and can be globally distributed and adminis-
tered. However, pressure to re-open economies rendering a uniform response, as has been the case
in the lockdown phase, is unlikely. EU Member States are not expected to conform to one plan of
action. Given the differing factors within Member States, such as the pace at which the virus spread
as well as the size and composition of national economies, a uniform approach should not be
viewed as a negative.
This section identifies key points regarding workplaces returning to normal. Guiding these
considerations are trepidations about the many variables on which we do not have much clarity,84
80. Para. 241(2) Civil Code.
81. Para. 14(4) Working Time Act.
82. E.g. Lauren Feiner, ‘States are bidding against each other and the federal government for important medical supplies –
and it’s driving up prices’ CNBC (11 April 2020), www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/why-states-and-the-federal-govern
ment-are-bidding-on-ppe.html.
83. Bryan Pietsch, ‘3 M denies German officials’ allegations that a mask shipment was diverted to the US in ‘‘an act of
modern piracy’’’ Business Insider (3 April 2020), www.businessinsider.com/3m-mask-shipment-to-berlin-germany-
diverted-united-states-report-2020-4?r¼DE&IR¼T.
84. The IMF characterised the matter in The Great Lockdown, 9, in this way: ‘Even after the severe downgrade to global
growth, risks to the outlook are on the downside. The pandemic could prove more persistent than assumed in the
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such as the pandemic’s resilience, which would then stretch existing income support plans, beg-
ging the question of what limitations there may be for states. Information on practices put in place
amongst those essential services (particularly health services and public transit) that continued
during the lockdown period will be essential in determining a safe approach to re-opening busi-
nesses. At present, this data has not been widely released. And so, the following focuses on those
workplaces that have been temporarily shut in response to the pandemic with an emphasis on
considerations in re-opening workplaces. Differing opinions regarding the conditions under which
workplaces may be re-opened suggest there may be a question as to whether this can be effected
without sufficient testing capacities85 and personal protective equipment for healthcare personnel
in place. To oversimplify the matter, those focused upon economic considerations have been
testing the limitations of the advice provided by those preoccupied with public health concerns.
The premise followed here is to rely upon public health advice which would require sufficient
testing capacity coupled with safe levels of personal protection equipment to be in place prior to a
re-opening that would see large cohorts of the population returning to work. If these safety
measures are not in place, then a wider range of possibilities must be contemplated as well as the
potential for another lockdown that may not be so uniform.86
A. Health & safety at work
As workers return to their workplaces, there is a question as to whether each individual will need to
establish for their employer that they are not only symptom-free of Covid-19, but that they are also
not an unknowing carrier of the virus. How would this be carried out, especially if a persistent
challenge has been understanding the causes of the virus and its transmission; not to mention the
availability and the processing of tests? Understandable concerns weigh on employers because
they have, not least based on EU law,87 an obligation to establish and maintain a safe workplace.
Aside from a right to remove oneself pursuant to Art. 13 of ILO Convention 155,88 the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union89 requires this of employers: ‘every worker has the
right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity’.90
baseline. Moreover, the effects of the health crisis on economic activity and financial markets could turn out to be
stronger and longer lasting, testing the limits of central banks to backstop the financial system and further raising the
fiscal burden of the shock. Of course, if a therapy or a vaccine is found earlier than expected, social distancing measures
can be removed and the rebound may occur faster than anticipated.’
85. Testing capacities include: a steady supply of tests to detect and treat individuals who have Covid-19; contact tracing of
those diagnosed with the virus; and treatment of those identified as having the virus through tracing.
86. This means that, without state intervention, measures to address increased infections within workplaces may be var-
ious. There may be no particular number of infections within one workplace that will necessitate closure or other steps.
Workplaces operating under different parameters will, among other things, likely contribute to a sense of anxiety and
confusion.
87. E.g. Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of
workers at work [1989] OJ L 183/1.
88. Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No.155). It is a question as to whether Covid-19 would constitute
an occupational disease if contracted at work, pursuant to ILO Recommendation 194 - List of Occupational Diseases
Recommendation, 2002, or if it falls within the ‘regulatory gap’ spoken of biological hazards discussed in ILO, ILO
Standards and Covid-19 (23 March 2020), vers.1.2, 16.
89. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391.
90. Art. 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
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Workers, too, have obligations which are directly related to those held by the employer, such as
complying with safety measures.91 Once workers are back on-site, they also participate in main-
taining safe work environments. The World Health Organisation has outlined some preventative
measures within workplaces that can diminish the spread of the virus: ‘Make sure your workplaces
are clean and hygienic’; ‘Promote regular and thorough hand-washing by employees, contractors,
and customers’; ‘Promote good respiratory hygiene in the workplace’.92 On 24 April 2020, the
European Agency for Health and Safety at Work issued non-binding guidelines to keep a healthy
and safe workplace, in which it outlined some issues employers should address when workers
return to the workplace as well as where workers remain teleworking.93
Bearing the above framework in mind, the orthodox meaning of safety has been a workplace
free from physical hazards to the health of employees (and visitors). Yet, safety has expanded as a
collective term including mental well-being (i.e. freedom from harassment or bullying). Covid-19
adds the obligation of ensuring a workplace that is safe for workers upon resumption of normal
business. In this respect, to use a benchmark of a workplace that is free of the virus would be
implausible given the many unknowns about Covid-19 and its transmission. To meet the on-going
obligation of a safe workplace94 means that employers will likely need to provide preventative
tools such as hand sanitiser, sanitising wipes for equipment (such as keyboards, telephones), and
perhaps even masks and gloves. Where employers decide to oblige their workers to keep a
minimum distance of 1 to 2 metres from the next person, the question remains what this means
in terms of the number of workers being able to return to their place of work, especially where
people share offices or work in open office spaces. It is particularly the latter where non-full-time
working staff may be disadvantaged; for employers might decide to give preference to the ‘stan-
dard workers’ as they work, quantitatively speaking, more.95 There is also a practical difficulty:
countries in which wearing masks and gloves has become mandatory when entering stores usually
advise that masks should be replaced after each visit. Would this mean that after each walk to the
printer or the bathroom, masks and gloves have to be replaced? And, what should workers do if
their employer refuses to provide masks? Can they stay away from the workplace without experi-
encing retaliation? Put otherwise: should workers have a right to work at home so as to avoid any
danger, i.e. the virus, to which they might be exposed?96
91. The ILO speaks to the intermingling of obligations between employers and employees in ILO, ILO Standards and
Covid-19 (23 March 2020), vers.1.2, 12: ‘Workers are responsible for cooperating in the fulfilment by their employer
of the OSH obligations placed on them, complying with the prescribed safety measures, taking reasonable care for the
safety of others (including avoiding exposing others to health and safety risks), and use safety devices and protective
equipment correctly.’
92. World Health Organisation, ‘Getting your workplace ready for COVID-19’ (19 March 2020), 2. https://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331584/WHO-2019-nCov-workplace-2020.2-eng.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
93. European Agency for Health and Safety at Work, ‘COVID-19: Back to the workplace - Adapting workplaces and
protecting workers’ (24 April 2020), https://osha.europa.eu/en/highlights/covid-19-back-workplace-safe-and-healthy-
conditions.
94. The International Labour Organisation has released a video with tips for businesses remaining open during the pan-
demic: www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/multimedia/video/institutional-videos/WCMS_740609/lang–en/index.htm.
These measures will likely be adaptable as more workplaces open.
95. Further considerations include the use of common areas such as lunch facilities and rest rooms. These areas may need
to be organised in a manner that will be unfamiliar to many workers.
96. The answer is in the affirmative in Ewan McGaughey, ‘Ten things the government can do right now to prevent a
Corona depression’ Institute for Employment Rights (20 March 2020), www.ier.org.uk/comments/ten-things-the-gov
ernment-can-do-right-now-to-prevent-a-corona-depression.
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Commencing back-to-work protocols constitutes one of the many challenges employers face. In
order to meet the aforementioned obligations, employers may seek information from workers and/
or employ other actions such as taking workers’ temperatures. These carry data protection, privacy
and discrimination questions which are discussed separately below. Here, the focus is on health
and safety alone. The ensuing discussion assumes that testing is not widely available (as has been
the case) and has been limited to only those who have symptoms and have been referred for a
test.97
Employees may be asked to establish that they are symptom-free before being permitted to
return to the workplace. This may take the form of an employee signing some sort of declaration
and providing that to the employer. This may or may not be binding upon employees; putting aside
individuals who are not truthful which may possibly be treated as an instance of gross misconduct
permitting the employer to immediately terminate employment. Employers may request medical
documentation. If employees have been treated for Covid-19, employers may require them to
establish that they are symptom-free. Again, this would seem to be a challenging matter to prove.
An ILO Recommendation seems to permit employers taking this step, albeit it very much depends
on the domestic labour regulations and whether social partners and/or works councils have a say in
this too.98
Steps such as taking employees’ temperatures may also be contemplated. Questions remain
regarding data protection implications regarding this act (discussed in the next sub-section). The
first matter is who can take employees’ temperatures: the employer? Or must this be conducted by
medical personnel? This may be a question of how a ‘medical act’ is defined in Member State law.
If it is defined broadly,99 employers may be precluded. A conservative approach would be to have
medical personnel undertake this. However, the pandemic has significantly stretched healthcare
resources, thereby rendering this a perhaps impractical default. Frank Hendrickx, Simon Taes and
Mathias Wouters argue that employers may do so in their preventative capacity.100 Using body
temperature as a benchmark has been reinforced by the World Health Organisation (WHO) advice
to employers: ‘anyone with even a mild cough or low-grade fever (37.3 C or more) needs to stay at
home.’101 And yet, one of the more disconcerting points emerging from news reports of Covid-19
must be transmission from individuals who exhibit no symptoms. Some hesitation is put forward
here in terms of solely relying upon body temperature as a rule in return to work. It may be a factor
in permitting employees back on-site, but a ‘normal’ temperature does not preclude the spread of
the virus. Temperature taking is therefore an imperfect measure, yet may be viewed as a step paired
with other preventative measures in workplaces.
Obvious questions arise regarding employees who upon returning to work show symptoms and
are then found to have Covid-19. Given how little is known about this coronavirus, it would be hard
to establish that subsequently diagnosed employees have breached a declaration; as there have
been reports of numbers of people who show no symptoms and have been subsequently found to
have the virus. There are also liability questions. Based on health and safety regulations such as
97. It remains unclear if an antigen test can establish that a human can organically fight off Covid-19.
98. Occupational Health Services Recommendation, 1985 (No. 171), para 11(1)(c).
99. It has been contended that Belgian law may be an example of such a broad definition: Pieter Pecinovsky, ‘FAQ:
Coronavirus and Belgian employment law’ (7 May 2020), www.vow.be/node/173/
100. Frank Hendrickx, Simon Taes, Mathias Wouters, in this volume.
101. World Health Organisation, ‘Getting your workplace ready for COVID-19’ (19 March 2020), 2. https://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331584/WHO-2019-nCov-workplace-2020.2-eng.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
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Directive 89/391/EEC, employers are obliged to take the necessary measures while workers have
to comply with them. But what happens to workers who, knowingly or not, have been infected with
Covid-19 and go to work? Without having any symptoms, it will take some days for this to be
discovered and the virus could easily spread among staff. Who is liable then, and what would this
mean where a Member State made a Covid-19-free workplace a precondition for being eligible for
(further) financial assistance to keep the business running and workers employed?
B. Data protection, privacy & discrimination
For labour law purposes, the classification of this health issue as one of data protection or privacy is
not clear. The ILO sets out Recommendations relating to the protection of workers’ privacy102 and
personal data.103
Given the wide scope of the term ‘personal data’ as defined in Art. 4 of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), the matter may be considered one of data protection, particularly a
‘special category’ of personal data.104 Art. 9(1) of the GDPR prohibits processing of health data,
but Art. 9(2) outlines some bases upon which such data may be lawfully processed. The GDPR
requires the explicit consent of the employee, which has been refined from that set out in the 1995
Directive, to processing their medical information. The processing of such data must also conform
to the principles set out in Art. 5 of the GDPR, including purpose limitation as well as lawfulness,
fairness, and transparency. To be lawful, processing may be undertaken pursuant to one of Art.
6(1)(c)-(f). Additionally, Art. 9(2)(b) GDPR (processing of data for the purposes of carrying out
obligations and exercising specific rights in employment) may be relied upon. Alternatively,
employers may invoke Art. 9(2)(i) GDPR (processing is necessary in the public interest); though
this step may be stronger if there is government guidance suggesting such actions be taken.105 This
option was endorsed by the ‘Statement on the processing of personal data in the context of the
COVID-19 outbreak’ released by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) on 19 March
2020.106 It declared that the processing of personal data by the employer might be necessary to
comply with health and safety measures in the workplace and made explicit reference to deroga-
tions through Articles Art. 9(2)(c) and 9(2)(i) of the GDPR, as well as Recital 46 of the Regulation
which refers to the control of an epidemic.107
Additionally, being required to reveal a diagnosis may constitute an intrusion upon an individ-
ual’s privacy, as protected under Art. 8 ECHR.108 Which recourse to take may be a matter of
establishing whether both routes are viable under national law and if they are, whether or not there
102. Occupational Health Services Recommendation, 1985 (No. 171), para 11(2).
103. Occupational Health Services Recommendation, 1985 (No. 171), para 14 discusses and the requirements relating to
disclosure of this information.
104. Article 9.
105. Council of Europe Convention 108þ as well as the ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)2 of the Committee of Ministers
to member States on the protection of health-related data’ should also be kept in mind.
106. https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/news/edpb_statement_2020_processingpersonaldataandcovid-19_en.pdf.
107. Though the EDPB identified Art.9(1)(i) and (c), Recital 46’s reference to serving interests may bring subsections
(d),(e) into consideration.
108. See for a brief overview of the distinction between privacy and data protection: Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta,
‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’ (2013) 4 Int’l
Data Priv. L. 222-228.
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are any limitations regarding awards. It should be borne in mind that given the fledgling state of the
GDPR, uncertainties remain.
Differential treatment must also be contemplated. Individuals with a young family or with
caring responsibilities for elderly parents may be more susceptible to contracting Covid-19. Out
of necessity, they must be the individuals to leave home in order to obtain food and medical
supplies. They may also be depended upon to clean items brought into the home from outside
(in order to follow guidance regarding the wiping down of groceries). It may be that either males or
females carry out these responsibilities, but historically this work has been performed by
females.109 And so, steps that target those who have been in contact with identified sufferers of
Covid-19 or who may have experienced symptoms may be indirectly discriminatory.
A vivid discussion relates to the opportunity to adopt so-called ‘contact-tracing apps’ that would
allow governments and citizens – employers included – to know if and when a certain individual
was located in the proximity of an infected person. The debate goes much beyond concerns upon
the employees’ position, but rather concerns citizens and their relationship with their own gov-
ernments and, even further, the legitimacy of the subjects (in some cases private companies) which
are in charge of the development of those apps and that might end up collecting relevant data,
including sensitive personal data. The discussion so far seems to be polarised between pro-privacy
and pro-public health concerns. Public debate leaves little space, if any, to reflect upon nuances.
Interestingly, the EDBP Statement of 19 March 2020,110 reads: ‘Public authorities should first seek
to process location data in an anonymous way (i.e. processing data aggregated in a way that
individuals cannot be re-identified), which could enable generating reports on the concentration
of mobile devices at a certain location (‘‘cartography’’). Personal data protection rules do not apply
to data which has been appropriately anonymised’. It further specifies that when the process must
necessarily involve non-anonymous data, Art. 15 of the ePrivacy Directive111 might come to hand
as it enables Member States to adopt measures that restrict rights and obligations established
therein when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure
within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public
security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.
The explicit reference by Art. 15 of the Directive to core state prerogatives (national security,
public security, defence, etc.) as possible justifications to narrow those rights ensured by that
Directive might be read as an obstacle for governments to completely outsource the development
and running of ‘contact-tracing apps’, as the ‘violation’ of the privacy rights in this respect might
be conducted only by public bodies for the purpose of pursuing public fundamental interests.
Therefore, the ultimate and sole responsibility relies on governments which might be the only
entities accessing data for the sole purpose of public health issues. This observation might not be
comforting, but could be used as an argument to oppose any attempt to entirely outsource the
functioning of those tracing systems with the high risk of misuse by privates or employers to detect
information to be used for different purposes than those indicated by Art. 15 (commercial purposes
first, but control on employees could also be foreseen).
109. The ILO identified the responsibilities imbalance between the genders as a matter for concern: ILO, ILO Standards
and Covid-19 (23 March 2020), vers.1.2, 18.
110. https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/news/edpb_statement_2020_processingpersonaldataandcovid-19_en.pdf.
111. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and
electronic communications). The ePrivacy Regulation remains a matter of discussion.
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C. Teleworking
In response to the pandemic, the role of the EU has largely been limited to finances. On 23 March
2020, Ministers of Finance agreed on the possibility to enforce the general escape clause of the
European fiscal framework, allowing Member States to break the limits to national budgets by
augmenting the national debt in order to face the economic consequences of the pandemic. The
European Central Bank (ECB) on 18 March commenced a EUR 750 billion Pandemic Emergency
Purchase Programme (PEPP), to provide financing conditions to react to the economic shock.
Significant debate continues regarding the opportunity to share part of the future national debts,
through so called euro-bonds or corona-bonds, as news media referred to them, in order to make
such debt more solid and attractive for public and private investors.
However, there is scope for a larger part. The EU has the capacity to regulate in the area of
working conditions and this competence has been enacted on different occasions (in areas such as
parental leave and working time). With so many workers taking up their duties at home during the
lockdown period in addressing the pandemic of 2020, there is an opportunity for a normative
intervention on telework (this term is used interchangeably with remote, agile or home work).
Indeed, the massive recourse to teleworking in many states to allow a certain continuation of
working activities while ensuring social distancing represents a good chance to observe unresolved
and shared problems related to forms of remote working. With no aim to reach easy conclusions,
some parameters to evaluate such regulatory issues are discussed in this section.112
i. From a Pandemic to a new workplace. With state-enforced social distancing including telework-
ing,113 the prospect of making telework a longer-term arrangement remains possible. While the
pandemic of 2020 directs efforts regarding telework, it should be recalled that the European Social
Partners concluded a Framework Agreement on Teleworking on 16 July 2002.114 At that time,
telework was viewed as ‘both as a way for companies and public service organisations to mod-
ernise work organisation, and as a way for workers to reconcile work and social life and giving
them greater autonomy in the accomplishment of their tasks.’115 This statement remains an impor-
tant guiding ethos. The Social Partners’ definition of telework operates in a similar manner:
‘TELEWORK is a form of organising and/or performing work, using information technology,
in the context of an employment contract/relationship, where work, which could also be performed
at the employers’ premises, is carried out away from those premises on a regular basis.’116 The
Agreement has been variously implemented within Member States.117
112. The following is viewed as building upon the earlier work in the area including Eurofound and the International
Labour Office, ‘Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world of work’, (Publications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg, and the International Labour Office, Geneva) (15 February 2017).
113. Teleworking is envisioned as an employee (engaged under an employment contract, and not a self-employed indi-
vidual) working from home as a fixed location. These employees may be directly hired for telework or move to
telework at some point during the life of the employment contract. As was the concern of the European Social Partners
in devising their Framework Agreement on Teleworking, no new employment status should arise from teleworking.
114. The European social partners ETUC (and the liaison committee Eurocadres-CEC), UNICE, UEAPME and CEEP
were signatories to the Agreement.
115. Ibid 31.
116. Ibid 32.
117. European Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the European social partners’ Framework Agreement on
Telework’ COM(2008) 412 final (2 July 2008).
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Of more immediate pertinence, the elaboration in the previous section regarding returning to
work and the health and safety considerations in the midst of a pandemic gives teleworking greater
impetus. Even with a staggered return to work, the challenge for businesses will be safely welcom-
ing workers back on-site. Workplaces that could continue during the lockdown with workers based
at home may be in a more favourable position to transition back to full on-site attendance at a
slower rate. The workplaces which cannot operate in this manner may need to function with
reduced staff, not only for business reasons but also for safety. If this were to be the case, many
may expect another rise in demand for state-based income support. It remains a question as to
whether this will materialise and, if so, in what form.
With teleworking, family constitutes one of (at least) the most important considerations. Tele-
working exposes a significant divide between those who have family (children or older parental) or
other caring obligations.118 Even with a return to school, family responsibilities carry the potential
of displacing the work day insofar as work not completed by school’s end may be put off to the
night time. When considering, for example, performance standards, there would be a foreseeable
challenge to a negative review of one teleworker who also has family responsibilities as compared
to another who does not.
ii. Threshold issues for teleworking. Teleworking falls under the umbrella term ‘smart working’, which
includes flexible working time and location arrangements. Smart working generally depends upon
enabling digital technologies. It is said to open up income-earning opportunities for a range of
individuals such as parents of school-age children. Smart working is an important tool in the
Europe 2020 goal of increasing employment levels to 75% (those aged between 20-64) by
2020. Given the pandemic, telework in particular has become a relied upon middle ground of
continuing work (where possible) as countries are largely in a lockdown situation. Indications are
that telework possibilities may continue to increase after a lockdown and beyond even the pan-
demic itself.119
Drawing from the Belgian legislation on telework, the distinction between structural and occa-
sional telework offers a beneficial starting point. In the lockdown phase of addressing the pan-
demic, the capacity for occasional teleworking under the Workable and Flexible Work Act120 has
been utilised. After several consecutive weeks of such ‘occasional’ teleworking, the question as to
whether it has become temporarily structural in the short-term arises.121 This distinction remains
important in the Belgian context because, amongst other items, it triggers certain obligations.
While the threshold for the triggering of these obligations can be difficult, the distinction prompts
a question regarding the persistence of teleworking: is it occasional and not defined (an opportunity
that can be used by mutual agreement of employer and employee) or is it regular in some manner.
Here another problem arises related to the role of the consent of the employee in adopting
teleworking arrangements. In a normal context, prior to the pandemic, many countries regulated
telework under the condition of an agreement between employer and employee on the decision to
118. 22% of respondents to a Eurofound survey spoke of difficulties when teleworking while also parenting children under
the age of 12 during the lockdown: Eurofound, ‘Living, working and COVID-19 First findings – April 2020’ 7.
119. The present considers only employees working for a company in their ‘home’ jurisdiction and not working outside of
it in another Member State. And so, the implications of teleworking and the Rome I Regulation are not discussed here.
120. Law 5 March 2017 on workable and agile work, Moniteur Belge 15 March 2017.
121. A question noted by Frank Hendrickx, Simon Taes, and Mathias Wouters in their assessment of the Belgian measures
in this volume.
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start teleworking, on the length of such a work arrangement, and on the adoption of technological
measures to allow parties to coordinate with each other (such as in Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium).
On this point, a fervent debate about teleworking has been raised. Indeed, many governments have
strongly recommended or even made mandatory, when possible, teleworking during the pick of the
pandemic. These measures might be softened or removed with the slow returning to normalcy.
Still, the question on what is the legal position of the employee in this context remains open: is s/he
being subjected to an order from the employer to perform his/her duties from home? Is s/he
required to agree with that with at least implicit consent? Or, eventually, is s/he entitled to the
right to work from home to protect his/her health? On the logistics side, questions include whether
or not workers have the proper equipment and space for teleworking. The employer’s prerogative
to impose teleworking might be legally justified under its obligation to adopt all possible measures
to ensure health and safety in the workplace. In the pandemic, this is strictly linked to social
distancing and therefore telework could be seen as one of such mandatory measures to protect the
health of the workers with which workers must comply. This reasoning, reasonable under excep-
tional circumstances, such as the spread of a highly contagious virus, might be questioned in the
near future as it might compromise work/life balances, private spaces, and burden employees with
risks and costs that should normally be borne by the employer.
There has been discussion of businesses reducing their office space as a cost-cutting expendi-
ture measure. Employees would fall into the structural category if they were to continue to meet
their work obligations for these employers from home exclusively.122 It may be different if
working from home was a regular occurrence, but constituted only a fraction of the working week
(for example working from a home office every Wednesday).123 This threshold speaks to when
certain obligations on employers may be triggered.
iii. Working conditions for teleworkers. Article L. 1222-9 (Te´le´travail) of the French Labour Code
gives some tentative guidance because the Code speaks of telework as an option that is occasional;
similar to occasional teleworking in Belgium discussed above. As noted, this discussion focuses on
telework as structural. Preconditions to telework include the following. Individuals teleworking
retain the same rights as those working in the employer’s premises. The decision to move in some
significant form to telework should be a decision agreed to by both the employer and employee.124
There must be some justification125 for denying a request to telework by the rejecting party.
Rejection may not be grounds by either party to treat the contract as at an end. The employment
conditions, rights and obligations applicable to both parties if work were conducted on the employ-
er’s premises should be applicable, insofar as they can be, to the teleworking situation. For
example, an injury incurred while teleworking should be treated as a workplace accident (bearing
in mind any particular role the employee as a teleworker may have had in any physical injury).
122. The regular performance of work from outside of the employer’s premises was a part of the European Social Partners’
definition of telework: European Social Partners, ‘Implementation of the European Framework Agreement on
Telework: Report of the European Social Partners’ (September 2006), 4.
123. Looking at the Working Time Directive, there is an argument regarding adapting the averaging of time used in the
Directive to the teleworking context. For example, in a one-month period, an employee may telework for what
amounts to an average of three days per week. For space reasons, this and other variations are not discussed at length
here.
124. The voluntariness found in the Belgian Feasible and Flexible Work Act seems apt here.
125. French Code L.1222-9 III.
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Where there are new parameters to be determined as a result of teleworking, these should be
agreed to by the parties.126 Agreement on such new parameters may include:127 hours of work
(though a default regular work day of 09:00 to 17:00 may be worth prescribing); means of
communication with colleague employees as well as the employers’ customers; secure means of
accessing employer servers from outside of the workplace facilities; privacy, such as monitoring
matters;128 training; equipment; and collective rights. The Italian legislation on smart working
(Law No. 81/2017) requires employers and employees to agree in writing, prior the commence-
ment of teleworking, on some specific aspects, such as the length of the teleworking period, limits
for the employer to exercise his/her directive and monitoring powers (to be discussed and agreed
with the employee), possible conducts that might be disciplinary sanctioned by the employer, use
of technologies, etc.
Teleworking carries the potential for longer working hours. The Italian law specifies that
regulations on the maximum length of the working time (daily and weekly) provided by the law
and by applicable collective bargaining agreements must be respected, therefore implying that
outside such working time framework no working activity can be demanded, and therefore also no
use of communication working tools. The French concept of the right to disconnect129 (le droit a´ la
de´connexion) encapsulates some longer-term considerations of teleworking coupled with health
and safety implications. Article 55 under Chapter II ‘Adapting the Labour Law to the Digital Age’
amended Art. L. 2242-8 of the Labour Code by adding paragraph (7), the right to disconnect.130
The ethos behind this right not only focuses on a work/life balance, but also implicates the
Working Time Directive.131
If remote working were to be undertaken, there is also a question of costs. Will employers need
to reimburse workers for increased utility expenses (electricity, heating, internet)? Would this be a
matter of taking office savings and moving them directly to workers? In Belgium, the National
Office of Social Security established a figure of EUR 126.94 as a ‘home-office allowance’ with a
formal telework agreement having been formalised by the parties.132 For structural teleworking,
some allowance should be set regarding the costs of operating from home.
126. This would be a change from the French Code L.1222-9 II where, absent a collective agreement, a charter drawn up by
the employer constitutes a default framework governing teleworking.
127. A number of these points are derived from the European Social Partners’ Framework Agreement, ‘Implementation of
the European Framework Agreement on Telework: Report of the European Social Partners’ (September 2006), 31 ff.
128. The precise parameters of, for example, monitoring employees remains an area for further critical consideration: see
further David Mangan, ‘Beyond Procedural Protection: Information Technology, Privacy and the Workplace’ (2019)
44 Eur. L. Rev. 559.
129. The idea originated with a decision of the Labour Chamber of the Court of Cassation, October 2, 2001 n99-42.727
and was brought into French law through the so-called the El Khomry laws.
130. Other Member States have taken similar steps. See for example, Italy: Senate Act no 2233-B ‘Measures to safeguard
non-entrepreneurial self-employment and measures to facilitate flexible articulation in times and places of sub-
ordinate employment’, Art. 19(1).
131. 2003/88/EC.
132. National Social Security Office, ‘Coronacrisis: maatregelen voor werkgevers’, https://rsz.fgov.be/nl/werkgevers-en-
de-rsz/coronavirus-maatregelen-voor-werkgevers/vergoeding-voor-thuiswerk. The document is not available in
English.
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IV. A century of anxiety
Hyperbole seems unlikely when considering the implications of Covid-19, so profound is the task
of next steps while many uncertainties remain. This final section situates the pandemic of 2020
within a larger workplace context.
Most immediate in memory will be the Great Recession of 2008-2013,133 though the circum-
stances surrounding the pandemic are expected to be worse, reaching the deepest recession expe-
rienced since the 1930s.134 In dealing with the economic downturn, some countries turned to
liberalising employment protections as a way to stimulate the economy. The UK Government,
as one example, doubled the period for qualification for unfair dismissal protection to two years135
and halved the minimum 90-day consultation period for dismissals of 100 or more workers.136 The
UK was not alone. About one-third of OECD countries between 2008-2013 liberalised employ-
ment protections.137 The overall deregulation aim had been, among other points, to better facilitate
the dismissal of workers, in terms of ease and cost, in order to incentivise hiring of new workers. It
remains somewhat curious that the emphasis was on job creation and not additionally job retention,
where the percentage of individuals taking up these new positions and retaining them138 was
equally valued. The danger of regression in employment protections increased, as these liberalising
protections were viewed as tools in decreasing unemployment figures.139 Questions regarding the
‘displacement of Social Europe’ arose,140 especially when Social Europe had driven much of EU
labour law.
The General Director of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Philippe Pochet, has not
anticipated a return to such neoliberal strategies.141 It may be argued that the pandemic of 2020
presents very different conditions than the Great Recession; in particular, the capacity for residents
to endure austerity. And yet, the idea of replacing rigidities with flexible regulation in order to
stimulate the economy remains seductively simple for a mass audience. There will be many voices
within EU Member States urging efforts to not only reduce spending deficits, but also to rapidly
recoup monies spent in addressing the pandemic’s effect on employment. Moreover, the political
factor renders the matter less predictable. Political parties eager to retain governing power will be
susceptible to the appearance of strong economic steps.142 A further factor with Covid-19, trust in
133. An end date of 2013 may be debated as the implications of the economic downturn arguably remained in effect up to
the point of the 2020 pandemic.
134. European Commission, European Economic Forecast – Spring 2020 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union, (May) 2020), 9.
135. The Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012 (SI
2012/989).
136. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (Amendment) Order 2013 (S.I. 2013/763), Art. 3(2).
137. OECD, Employment Outlook 2013, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2013/protecting-
jobs-enhancing-flexibility-a-new-look-at-employment-protection-legislation_empl_outlook-2013-6-en.
138. Past the threshold for dismissal protections, if any such threshold exists.
139. Stefano Giubboni, ‘The rise and fall of EU labour law’ (2018) 24 Eur. Law J. 7, 8.
140. Claire Kilpatrick, ‘The displacement of social Europe: a productive lens of inquiry’ (2017) 14 Euro. Cons. Law
Rev. 62.
141. Philippe Pochet, ‘Edito#63: The big question is what will happen after Covid-19’ (March 2020), www.etui.org/
Newsletters/Edito-63-The-big-question-is-what-will-happen-after-Covid-19
142. On this point, it is wondered if the UK factors into EU considerations insofar as the UK may strive to be light on
regulation as compared to the EU.
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EU and national governments has fallen ‘dramatically’.143 In addition, optimism for the future has
dropped significantly in those Member States hardest hit by the coronavirus (Belgium, France,
Italy, Spain).144 The challenge faced by government is daunting. In this last section, the case
against the austerity of the Great Recession will be made. Instead, the pandemic compels reconsi-
deration of work and its regulation.145 While space precludes detailed elaboration, some guiding
parameters are discussed below.
A. Deepening precarity. The term ‘deepening precarity’146 embodies the concern put forward
here. Prior to the pandemic of 2020, weakening of employment protections had affected a broad
portion of the workforce resulting in pervasive vulnerability of workers in general. The unsettling
reality now being faced is that of drifting into differing degrees of insecurity (whether it be reduced
hours, uncertainty regarding current jobs, redundancy, or future employment prospects). This fear
is not unique to any one worker group; concerns enveloping workers more widely that Guy
Standing associated with the ‘precariatised mind’.147 Covid-19 pushes to the forefront the unset-
tling reality of work’s (as a means of supporting oneself or a family) contingent nature. Deepening
precarity is a way to assess next steps (particularly where they affect employment regulation) by
considering the perceived benefits of plans, contrasted with the effect of increased exposure to risk.
The emphasis is on considering whether a change in regulation will exacerbate current challenges
and if so whether the perceived trade-off is in fact a viable outcome.
Overall though, the economic and societal challenges stemming from the pandemic require
taking a more systematic perspective to consider the future of work. Living and working in a
globalised world has led to a complex web of economic interdependence, where products and parts
of products are produced in different countries while being put together in another. The problems
instigated by Covid-19 greatly narrowed supply chain capacity; spurring a relational effect on
those who depend in various ways on this production line remaining intact, at its customary
volume.
i. Essential products. One area stands out as a starting point for this reconsideration: essential
products. The question posed is: taking this supply chain discussion into account, do ‘essential
materials’ (personal protective equipment (PPE) may be an exemplar) need to be manufactured
domestically or at least within the EU for Member State consumption? Costs constituted the
primary reason why goods or parts of their production were transferred abroad. Would govern-
ments be willing to absorb the higher cost of production of these goods domestically so as to ensure
their availability (and continued production) in times of urgent need (which need not be limited to a
pandemic). The suggestion here is not to regulate for the next pandemic (keeping in mind that
Covid-19 has not ended as a global health challenge at the time of writing). Instead, the premise is
143. Eurofound, ‘Living, working and COVID-19 First findings – April 2020’ 1, 3.
144. Ibid 2.
145. Innovations in information technology (including algorithms and artificial intelligence) which preceded the pandemic
meant that this task had been underway, though with some diverging concerns.
146. Discussion of the term in more detail is found in David Mangan, ‘Deepening Precarity in the United Kingdom’ in Jeff
Kenner, Izabella Florczak and Marta Otto (eds.), Precarious Work. The Challenge for Labour Law in Europe
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 58.
147. Guy Standing, The Precariat (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 20.
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that preparedness for national health emergencies may not harmoniously fit with approaches that
measure decisions based on orthodox views of economic value.
It may or may not be economically effective to produce PPE domestically. And yet, this should
not be the sole factor in deciding to do so148 because Covid-19 has exposed the limitations of the
exclusively economic outlook. Sadly, the pandemic revealed the human cost of this particular
failing of the global supply chain. The fact that medical personnel became infected just in the
course of doing their jobs because of a lack of protective equipment should itself be an indictment
of how work has been conducted during the lockdown phase. The ‘bidding war’ for PPE amongst
countries and even regions within countries must be a source of remarkable concern because it
arose during a pandemic. The underappreciation of the social impact compounds the distressing
inventory that can be taken.
ii. Industry 4.0. This last part has been called a century of anxiety because Covid-19 is the second
significant concern to face the workplace entering the 21st century. It may be easy to forget that,
just before the pandemic, the worry had been the future of work. Whether it was called ‘Industry
4.0’149 or the Fourth Industrial Revolution,150 disquiet had increased (and likely remains), as have
the prognostications.151 Important contributions to the discussion have been made regarding ‘gig
work’152 and employment status.153 However, these are indicators of a larger predicament. The
remarkable attention given to technological advances has diverted from the essential considera-
tions of continuities and trajectory; that is, there remain consistent aims discernible in Industry 4.0,
but there is also a new question as to their trajectory.
Through the different stages of industrial revolutions, the measurement of efficiency has
focused primarily on the economy. A key aim has been reduction in expenditures in order to
maximise profit. The term ‘hyperscaling’ (increasing the market potential for a business which is
largely data centred) encapsulates not only the business approach to ‘Industry 4.0’, but also the
expectations attached. Consider the differences in numbers between two large and important
industries, automobile manufacturing and information technology in, respectively, Detroit and
Silicon Valley.154 In 1990, Detroit housed 1.2 million employees, whereas the latter had
137,000 employees in 2014. Both had similar revenues (approx. USD 250 billion). However,
Silicon Valley experienced a much higher market capitalisation of USD 1.09 trillion (compared
to USD 36 billion in 1990 Detroit). Industry 4.0 has affected one disconcerting change to the
workforce: information technology facilitates an unprecedented capacity to diminish the place and
number of human workers.
148. The UK Government noted its investigation of this opportunity in ‘Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government’s
Covid-19 Recovery Strategy’ CP 239 (May 2020), 33.
149. European Parliament, Industry 4.0: Digitalisation for Productivity and Growth (September 2015).
150. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016).
151. See for example, Carl Benedikt Frey, The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); Daniel Susskind, AWorld Without Work: Technology, Automation, and
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The second point noted at the outset of this subsection is the question of the trajectory of
technological innovations. In this fourth industrial revolution, deliberation upon a social dimension
must be a higher-rated factor. Certainly, it complicates the measurement of efficiency. The con-
sideration contains angst: will there be sufficient work for humans to earn a living? The question
was posed, implicitly, by Queen Elizabeth I in the 16th century to William Lee, and she also
provided her answer in the negative.155
Overall, there have been two opinions regarding the impact on work of technological innova-
tions. There are those who argue that there is a real danger that human work will be largely
displaced. Conversely, there are those who believe, as with the preceding ‘industrial revolutions’,
that there will remain a place for human labour; that is, human work will be different but continue.
The argument here is that the present situation is different from those we have seen before. Those
providing ‘intellectual or physical capital’ are the ‘beneficiaries’ of the fourth industrial revolu-
tion.156 Capitalism has progressed on ideas. Now the idea is data. There seems to be a steady
supply of the source material. Why the present is different is due to this point: data does not require
nearly the same physical labour to fashion it into a consumable product. The argument here does
not criticise innovation or seek to stifle it. Rather, the point underscored is simple. There is no
massive human workforce required to ‘harvest’ this commodity. There may be new labour created,
but uncertainties linger, such as the volume of jobs and for whom. Much of this work has been
designed to be automated. And yet, another requirement is the implicit need for consumers in order
for data to retain its value. Over time, the reduction in the workforce has been a particular focus,
but the corollary role of workers also being consumers (who can afford to be such) has not
necessarily garnered equal attention.
To this, we add the pandemic and its implications.
V. Conclusion: Labour is not simply a commodity
Discussions on the ‘future of labour law’ have loomed large for years;157 addressing issues such as
the ‘death of labour law’, broadening the personal scope of employment relationships or estab-
lishing in-between categories.158 What seems to unite many of the contributions that have been
made is that labour law has been ‘attacked’: for being inflexible; limiting innovation; its ineffi-
ciency;159 and the need to bring back a more human-centred approach. It is the latter with which we
wish to end this contribution.
The Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Article 427 states: ‘that labour should not be regarded merely
as a commodity or article of commerce.’ This has been a principle of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) since its establishment in the same year. The ILO’s Philadelphia Declaration
155. While it is expected that Queen Elizabeth I was lobbied by affected guilds, this may not have been the sole impetus for
her denying William Lee’s patent request as suggested in Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael Osborne, ‘The Future of
Employment: How Susceptible are jobs to computerisation?’ (Oxford Martin School, 2013), 7.
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157. To mention only oft-referred to academic endeavours: Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds.), Boundaries and
Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006); and Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds.), The Idea of
Labour Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011).
158. Briefly discussed in Miriam Kullmann, ‘Work-related Securities: An Alternative Approach to Protect the Work-
force?’ (2018) 34 Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L. & Ind. Rel. 395.
159. Overall, the ‘attacks’ mostly address what labour law is not instead of what labour law is and can do. Moreover, the
argument often is that labour law should be subordinated to other, economic, interests.
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1944 abbreviated this to ‘labour is not a commodity’. Labour is not simply a commodity because it
incorporates more than just a (quantifiable) market value.160 And so, it remains a valuable phrase;
perhaps more so in 2020.
The pandemic has shown (and will likely further reveal) many important points. Essential
workers include those who are employed at grocery stores, who stock shelves at pharmacies, and
who make deliveries. There are positive aspects of advances in information technology; as many,
but certainly not all, individuals can carry on their work while at home and continue to earn an
income.161 Sadly, it has also laid bare the hazards of work, especially when workers are not
properly equipped with protective garments. In each of these, there is a financial value affixed.
And yet, the pandemic has shown that each person can contribute more than just the financial value
of their labour. This is why labour is not simply a commodity. This is also why there is a
fundamental need to substantially and thoroughly think of the way forward, for labour law, and
for society at large. With the pandemic not having ended and the resulting insecurity, a return to
widespread pre-pandemic normalcy is unlikely to quickly arise.
Considering more immediate steps to follow in the short term, some inspiration may be drawn
from ILO Recommendation 205 on ‘Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience
Recommendation’.162 Acknowledging that a ‘universal and lasting peace can be established only
if it is based upon social justice’ and stressing the respect of ‘fundamental principles and rights at
work and for international labour standards, in particular those rights and principles relevant to
employment and decent work’, the ILO recommends its members adopt a phased multi-track
approach that, inter alia, should aim at preventing crises, enabling recovery, and building resi-
lience. Part of this approach is to offer immediate income protection, as many states have done.
Greater difficulty is evident in fostering a local economic recovery so as to get people back to work
in a sustainable manner with decent work opportunities, and applying a gender perspective.
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